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PUZZLES
CHURCH is "DEEPLY" PUZZLED by "the ideathat we can be ignorant of our own rea-sons" (2005, 31). I was, at first sight,
puzzled by this puzzlement.
There is no question that we, indeed, are igno-
rant of many of our reasons. In cases of routine
behavior, for instance, we are often not, or only
dimly, aware of the reasons for doing something.
When I use the indicator when taking a turn to
the left with my car, 1 have no conscious reason
for doing so. It has become routine behavior,
acquired during my lessons in car driving. My
non-awareness may even be considered as sign of
my excellence as a driver. This non-awareness is
most noteworthy in all those cases in which we,
again routinely, withdraw from a particular ac-
tion. Education and training not only teach us
how and why to perform certain activities, they
also give us reasons to refrain from all sorts of
other actions. There are many reasons to do
certain things; there seem to be many more rea-
sons for not doing other things. To suppose that
having reasons would by necessity involve con-
scious awareness of these reasons would life make
impossible to live.
So, ignorance seems to be very common, not
to say trivial. This raises the question whether
there is anything nontrivial in the attempt to
make sense of ignorance of our reasons. What
element or aspect of ignorance is it that may
evoke philosophical interest? Jennifer Church
seems to have in mind different overlapping con-
cerns. In the first part of her paper, she addresses
(1) the issue of legitimacy; that is, the specification
of conditions under which attributions of un-
conscious content are legitimate or illegitimate;
and
(2) the issue of normativiry; that is, the question
how and why unconscious reasons can be nor-
mative for me.
The first question can be discussed without refer-
ence to a self; the second question cannot. In the
second part of the paper there arise new concerns:
(3) the issue of having reasons that can not be
recognized as reasons by oneself, "strange rea-
sons" so to say, with spatial reasoning as a
paradigm case; and
(4) the issue of being moved by ones reasons through
the visceral connection between desires and be-
liefs on the one hand and motor activity (exter-
nal or internal) on the other hand; this connec-
tion is secured by our emotions.
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RECAPITULATION
Let me try to recapitulate some of the main
issues. Church makes, first, a distinction between
having access to one's reasons and recognizing
one's reasons as reasons. She proceeds by dis-
cussing the no-access problem in terms of a func-
tionalist metaphysics of mental states. Then she
suggests that ascribing unconscious content (or
reason) to a person, in fact, boils down to the
evaluation of the appropriateness of the ascrip-
tion of a specimen of practical reasoning to the
subject. Practical reasoning involves the struc-
tured connection and interaction between beliefs
and desires. This structure can be studied at the
level of animal psychology; however, there are
some important differences between humans and
animals: humans can withhold assent, they can
lie, and they may recognize mistakes, whereas
animals cannot. The possibility of being mistak-
en about one's reasons leads from the issue of
legitimacy to the issue of normativity. For a rea-
son to become my reason, the belief-desire net-
work should make sense, I should feel norma-
tively compelled in some way. So the issue of
normativity cannot be studied apart from the
possibility of recognition. To recognize a reason
as one's reason, one has—at some level of under-
standing—to assent with its content, even if this
occurs implicitly.
In the second part the conditions for recogni-
tion are investigated in the form of an analysis of
unconscious reasons that are strange. Strange
reasons are not recognized because they function
in some different way compared to normal con-
scious reasoning. Strangeness is defined here in
terms of a different way of processing beliefs,
and not, or not only, in terms of (un)familiarity
of content. The focus is on norms of reasoning
that are uncharacteristic for conscious thought.
Church, then, proposes spatial reasoning as a
possible candidate. In the spatial world logical
constants (if/then, either/or, no), temporal rela-
tions, absence, and possibility cannot be repre-
sented. So the spatial world is poorer on the one
hand, because it cannot represent some common
logical, modal, and temporal relations; it is, on
the other hand, also more concrete, flexible, and
precise. Finally, she attempts to show that this
spatial, imaginative world may constitute a "vis-
ceral connection" between one's body and the
objects of belief and desire—a connection that
"secures the transition from belief and desire to
action" (2005, 38).
TOWARD A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT
OF SPATIALIZED REASONING
My main question is whether Church has suc-
ceeded in providing an account of reasons that
are processed differently than normal conscious
ones and are nevertheless normative, in the sense
that they express why this particular reason holds
for me. Why is spatial reasoning a specimen of
reasoning, instead of some causal mechanism
underlying a network of conscious contents (be-
liefs, desires, and plans)?1 What kind of "me" or
"self" is this normativity referring to?
The very notion of "holding for me" suggests
that even at the level of spatial representation
there must exist a relation with a "me" for which
the spatialized reasoning holds. However, at this
level of understanding it is difficult to imagine
how such a normative relationship would look.
There may of course be spatial representations of
the self that relate to the relevant spatial network
representing "reason" or "reasoning." If there
would be any normativity at this level, it is high-
ly plausible that this normativity would differ
considerably from the normativity holding for
conscious reasons. Doubts may arise here, be-
cause it is so easy to imagine that at this concep-
tual level there are only spatial patterns without
any normative appeal. However, spatialized rea-
sonings have "peculiarities of function" that are
"content constituting," according to Church
(2005, 38). If this is indeed the case, it seems
plausible to suggest that these peculiarities are
constitutive for this other type of normativity;
for instance, a kind of "logic" (or appeal or
"evidentially"), which is typical for dream states;
or, for some protoform of imagination, childlike
or not.
At this point, the roads diverge, I guess. Some
argue that the normativity of spatialized reason-
ing can only be guaranteed by presupposing the
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existence of a superordinate "self" at the back-
ground of one's mental operations. Spatial rea-
soning should then be conceptualized as being
related, in a way to be specified, to the simulta-
neous functioning of superordinate levels of co-
herence and self-understanding. In this hierar-
chical model, the self functions as a global notion,
representing the "whole." This self may be seen
as a uniting and coordinating dynamic at the
background of daily routines. Normativity in the
sense of "holding for me" then means that the
presupposed normativity of spatialized reason-
ing is based on the relationship between spatial
figures (or condensations) and a simultaneously
present "self." My problem is that this formula-
tion is not precise enough; it does not give a clue
about the way this global self codetermines the
nature of the relationship with the spatial pat-
tern; in short, it does not make explicit what
kind of normativity is implied in spatialized rea-
soning.
Church does, however, not seem to be inclined
to follow this path. She chooses another direc-
tion by connecting the normativity of spatialized
reasoning to the structure of emotional reason-
ing. Emotions presuppose a "visceral connec-
tion," which guarantees the connection with a
self, this time a bodily self. This connection ex-
plains the urge emotions add to our acts. How-
ever, what has urge to do with normativity? How
could the visceral connection establish a norma-
tivity of reasoning that makes sense for me and
not for merely "a" body, even if this body is
mine?
The analogy between spatialized and emo-
tional reasoning may be well taken with regard
to the analysis of emotions as such.2 However,
the analogy begs the question of normativity.
Either one's theory of emotions and of emotional
reasoning does already conceptually imply a more
developed notion of the self, which leads to the
question whether there is a qualitative difference
between normativity for unconscious and for
conscious reasoning. Or, one adopts a more re-
ductive theory of emotion that cannot account
for such a developed "self." At that level of
conceptualization, it may even become question-
able whether it is possible at all to refer to nor-
mativity. The answer to that question depends
on one's ontology, for instance, whether one is
inclined to ascribe normativity to biological func-
tioning. However, even with a normative ac-
count of biological function and the biological
underpinnings of our imaginations, we are far
from an answer to the question why unconscious
reasons hold for me, instead of for a body.
In sum, we are left with questions about the
nature of the normativity of spatialized reason-
ing. Accounts referring to a fully developed self
presuppose a normativity, and it will be hard to
show that it differs substantially enough from
the normativity of conscious states. On the other
hand, accounts that only refer to the bodily basis
of spatial reasoning do not seem to be powerful
enough to explain why unconscious reasons can
be my reasons in a more than descriptive sense.3
FAILING APPROPRIATION
It is the merit of Jennifer Church's analysis
that she has focused the discussion to a highly
critical point: the implicit normativity of parts of
one's existence that do not feel as being part of
one self. I am inclined to agree with Church that
even preverbal forms of experience may exert a
normative claim, in the sense that they may say
something about me and call for appropriation.
However, appropriation may fail. And recogni-
tion may be delayed or may never occur. So,
what to say if this is the case? Is normativity
absent in case of failing appropriation or delay
of recognition? To admit this would imply a
denial of the possibility of having reasons of
which reason does not know/ However, this con-
clusion is not inevitable. What has to be consid-
ered is, at least, the dimension of time; the fluid-
ity of the emotional processes when the
unconscious dynamic unfolds over time and
comes to the surface in the therapeutic relation;
and, most importantly, the assumption of nor-
mativity in situations in which it seems to be
absent.5
Church focuses on forms of reasoning that
function differently. She refers to Freud's "func-
tional" account of the unconscious to clarify
what she means by "differently functioning." At
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the same time, she does not give up the idea that
the framework of practical reasoning is adequate
to analyze these "differently functioning" rea-
sons. Two points should be raised here, namely,
whether the reference to Freud's metapsychology
does clarify anything and whether the frame-
work of practical reasoning is adequate for the
type of reasons we are discussing.'
In my view, it is almost impossible to defend a
view in which Freud's account of unconscious
processing, for instance in the 7th chapter of The
Interpretation of Dreams and in The Uncon-
scious, is interpreted as a exemplifying a subtype
of practical reasoning. Such a view stretches the
meaning of reason too much. Freud's metapsy-
chology provides a kind of hydraulics of uncon-
scious mental functioning. Within such a frame-
work it is in fact impossible to introduce concepts
like belief and reasoning. Freud's unconscious is
a quasi-mechanical device. It is hard to see how
such a device could reason, even if reason is
taken in a metaphorical sense.7 Intriguingly
enough, Church seems to be fully aware of this.
She refers to the absence of time and logical
constants in the unconscious. Beliefs, however,
refer to an evidential context; that is, a context in
which one can assent or dissent on the basis of
evidence. It is hard to see how this could occur at
the level of the unconscious.
Instead of focusing on what Church could
mean, let me simply formulate some suggestions.
The rationality of unconscious processes may,
indeed, be uncovered by the analyst, that is, by a
reconstruction of the plurality of unconscious
symbolic meanings from the perspective of the
person's life story and of what is going on in the
therapeutic situation. This reconstruction is not
laying bare some hidden content; it is not like
breaking the seal of a closed pot and watching
what it contains. Reconstruction is a bringing to
life of crystallized, frozen content. Content can
best be conceptualized as the ensemble of inter-
nalized self- and object-representations and their
interaction. Meaning and normativity emerge in
and by the act of uncovering, which is at the
same time a discovery and a recovery. Meaning
comes to expression in the relational dynamic
between the patient and the analyst, which is a
dynamic that transforms the "repetition compul-
sion" of "frozen" inner self-object relationships
into something more lively and real.
So, it is not Freud's hydraulic metapsychology
but psychodynamic practice that gives important
clues as to what is really occurring. In their
"frozen" form, unconscious reasons are reasons
with a merely hypothetical existence, that is, as
long as they remain unaddressed. These reasons,
of course, influence the feelings and behavior of
the client. However, their normativity and ratio-
nality only become apparent in the therapeutic
situation, that is, in a situation in which the
client is asked to take a stance toward his or her
non-understood inclinations and feelings. It is of
utmost important to realize that the therapeutic
relation is determined by the assumption that
such rationality and normativity exists. The driv-
ing force behind psychodynamic psychotherapy
is the paradoxical assumption of something that
does not seem to exist at the moment of its
assumption. This "something" is meaning (in the
midst of meaninglessness), rationality (in a con-
text of irrationality), and normativity (in a situa-
tion in which brute facts seem the only reality).
From a philosophical point of view this assump-
tion can be interpreted as an expectation with
respect to the possibility of opening up (or un-
folding) of latent modes of functioning. Quasi-
physical entities (the sensation of a lump in one's
throat, for instance) are opened up in a biologi-
cal sense (difficulty in speaking and in swallow-
ing), in an emotional sense (the lump is felt as
anxiety), in a symbolic sense (the feeling repre-
sents both the desire and the prohibition to speak),
in a relational sense (the analyst may be seen as a
parental figure who forbids the expression of a
particular emotional need), and so on.
Unconscious reasons remain incomprehensi-
ble as long as they are considered apart from the
interpersonal dynamic between the patient and
the therapist (or important others). Their moti-
vational force comes to surface and manifests
itself in the interaction with the therapist (or
important others), first by repetition, then in
resistance to interpretation and change, and fi-
nally in tolerance and molding of meaning.
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IRRATIONAL EMOTION
There is one other aspect of Church's analysis
of unknown reasons I want to address, because it
challenges the central role of practical reasoning.
Church seems to acknowledge that the object of
emotional discomfort need not be identical to
the object of one's conscious beliefs. One may
think here of the case of suspicion, in which a
person cannot stop feeling suspicious in a situa-
tion without any evidence whatsoever of un-
trustworthiness of the person who is suspected.
In this case a person rationally rejects the possi-
bility of being misguided. He or she may try to
explain away the feeling and will possibly also
give full consent to the belief that the other
person is trustworthy. Nevertheless the feeling of
discomfort remains and may be appropriate—
not only when, in spite of all the earlier evidence,
it finally appears that the other person cannot be
trusted; but also at those moments of suspicion,
in which there is no evidence that could support
or falsify one's thoughts.
The latter case is, of course, the most interest-
ing for our discussion. How could emotions be
appropriate or warranted in situations in which
the feeling contradicts the prevailing belief or in
which there is simply no corresponding belief?
Patricia Greenspan puts it this way:
The prepositional object of emotional discomfort
need not be an object of belief. [...].. my emotion may
be appropriate, not... because ... it happens to fit the
facts, but rather because it is ... 'controlled by' some
relevant features of my perceptual situation. [...] From
my current evidential standpoint the emotion would
seem to be best explained by my own uneasiness. So it
seems that the emotion may be appropriate in a case
where its corresponding belief is neither warranted
nor held. (Greenspan 1988, 6)
I am inclined to agree with this position. The
important point to note here is that the appropri-
ateness of irrational emotions is not accounted
for in terms of degree of evidence for some hid-
den belief, although there may exist such a belief.
The notion of "appropriateness" has a more
limited scope, by referring to "a practical adap-
tiveness or a kind of instrumental value, that is
not properly brought to bear on assessments of
belief warrant"(Greenspan 1988, 7). In fact, this
suggestion does not differ much from what
Church seems to have in mind. The difference
concerns the role of belief in unconscious reason-
ing: Church adheres to a conceptualization in
terms of practical reasoning, whereas I am in-
clined to limit the use of belief to situations in
which assent on the basis of at least some evi-
dence is possible.
Practical adaptiveness means making a person
aware of relevant features of the "perceptual
situation," signaling cues—referring to threat,
competition, envy, or comfort—beyond or out-
side the focus of one's immediate awareness.
When this occurs it may imply that we are war-
ranted in relying on the evaluative component of
emotions, even if the object of evaluation is in-
definite. In other words, belief is not the key
component to emotion in situations in which we
are unaware of its reasons.
NOTES
1. This was indeed Freud's position. Mechanisms
like condensation and displacement are described as
causally effective mechanisms underlying phenomena
like conversion and dreaming; however, they display at
the same time a particular emotional and personal
meaning from an overarching perspective, the perspec-
tive of the biographical self with its conflicts and unful-
filled desires. Church, to my impression, does not suffi-
ciently acknowledge that the quasi-mechanical workings
of the unconscious, in the end, have a merely instru-
mental role with respect to the underlying meaning of
the repressed conflict. Causal "mechanisms" like con-
densation, displacement, and the "mechanisms" of de-
fense, serve biological, emotional, and social ends.
2. Her approach fits well with other recent ap-
proaches which view consciousness as a form of action
and see motor behavior at the basis of mental processes
(Hurley 1998).
3. It is easy to see how close the issue of normativity
is connected with discussions about the conceptual
status of the first-person perspective. Recognition pre-
supposes a rudimentary sense of self. And this sense of
self seems to be implied in the recognition of normativ-
ity. However, it seems safe, as Church does, to keep the
two issues apart. Normativity does not depend on the
subjective recognition of norms.
4. Sturdee's distinction between involuntary irratio-
nality, unconscious irrationality, and rationally moti-
vated irrationality may be helpful here. Unconscious
irrationality remains nontransparent and withstands
rational clarification (Sturdee 1995).
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5. This is another way to approach the subject of
our earlier discussion, that is, whether the belief-desire
structure of practical reasoning does hold for all cases
of unconscious reasoning and whether there are, per-
haps, more primitive forms of processing which are
still rational (and normative) in some way.
6. It should be noticed that there is a transition in
Church's account from the legitimate ascription of
reasons (of which one knows not) to the legitimate
ascription of (practical) reasoning
7. In my view, Church's reference to animal reason-
ing should be considered as an example of such a
metaphorical use of reasoning.
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